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During the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, an outbreak occurred following attendance of a 
symptomatic index case at a regular weekly rehearsal on 10 March of the Skagit Valley 
Chorale (SVC). After that rehearsal, 53 members of the SVC among 61 in attendance 
were confirmed or strongly suspected to have contracted COVID-19 and two died. 
Transmission by the airborne route is likely. It is vital to identify features of cases such 
as this so as to better understand the factors that promote superspreading events. 
Based on a conditional assumption that transmission during this outbreak was by 
inhalation of respiratory aerosol, we use the available evidence to infer the emission 
rate of airborne infectious quanta from the primary source. We also explore how the risk 
of infection would vary with several influential factors: the rates of removal of respiratory 
aerosol by ventilation; deposition onto surfaces; and viral decay. The results indicate an 
emission rate of the order of a thousand quanta per hour (mean [interquartile range] for 
this event = 970 [680-1190] quanta per hour) and demonstrate that the risk of infection 
is modulated by ventilation conditions, occupant density, and duration of shared 
presence with an infectious individual.  
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Practical Implications 
• During respiratory disease pandemics, group singing indoors should be 
discouraged or at a minimum carefully managed as singing can generate large 
amounts of airborne virus (quanta) if any of the singers is infected. 
• Ventilation requirements for spaces that are used for singing (e.g., buildings for 
religious services and rehearsal/performance) should be reconsidered in light of 
the potential for airborne transmission of infectious diseases.  
• Meetings of choirs and other kinds of singing groups during pandemics should 
only be in spaces that are equipped with a warning system of insufficient 
ventilation which may be detected with CO2 “traffic light” monitors.  
• Systems that combine the functions heating and ventilation (or cooling and 
ventilation) should be provided with a disclaimer saying “do not shut this system 
off when people are using the room; turning off the system will also shut down 
fresh air supply, which can lead to the spread of airborne infections.” 
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Introduction 
SARS-CoV-2 was first reported in China at the end of 2019 and rapidly spread to the 
rest of the world over the subsequent months. Evidence from laboratory studies has 
shown that the SARS-CoV-2 virus can remain infectious while airborne for extended 
periods.1,2 The virus has been detected by PCR in the air in several healthcare 
environments.3-9 Researchers have reported values for the SARS-CoV-2 viral load in 
the mouth that span an extraordinarily broad range: 102 and 1011 copies per mL of 
respiratory fluid.10-12 Viral loads vary over the course of the disease, tending to peak at 
the onset of symptoms.  
Airborne transmission is now strongly suspected to play a significant role in 
superspreading events (SSEs) under certain conditions.13 SSEs occur when a large 
number of secondary transmissions are produced early in an outbreak and transmission 
is sustained in later stages.14 Some people release respiratory aerosol at an order of 
magnitude greater rate than their peers and might contribute to superspreading 
events.15  The very broad range of viral loads in respiratory fluids may also be an 
important factor influencing SSE. An infectious respiratory aerosol is a collection of 
pathogen-laden particles in air emitted during respiring activities of an infected 
individual. 16 
In this paper, we first estimate the infectious quanta emission rate during a choir 
rehearsal that has been identified as a superspreading event. Quanta are used to 
represent infectious respiratory aerosol when the actual viral dose in the aerosol and 
the human dose-response required to cause infection are unknown.17,18 We then 
explore the sensitivity of the secondary attack rate of infection to the loss rate of 
airborne virus, whether by ventilation, deposition onto surface, or biological decay. 
Case Study 
An SSE occurred in Skagit Valley, Washington, USA.19 When the Skagit Valley Chorale 
(SVC) met on the evening of March 10, 2020, one person attending the rehearsal had 
cold-like symptoms that had developed three days earlier; that individual subsequently 
tested positive for COVID-19. This person is considered the “index case.” 
The chorale met in the Fellowship Hall of a church in Mount Vernon, Skagit County. 
Earlier that day, the governor of Washington recommended physical distancing and no 
large group meetings in three other nearby counties. At the time of the rehearsal, there 
were no known COVID-19 cases in Skagit Valley County, nor were any closures in 
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effect. Before detecting the cluster on March 17, Skagit county had developed seven 
COVID-19 cases.  
The SVC has 122 members, but only 61 attended rehearsal on March 10, amid 
concerns about COVID-19 transmission. Precautions were taken during rehearsal, 
including the use of hand sanitizer, no hugging or handshakes, and maintaining 
distance between singers.20  
Some members began experiencing illness from March 11 to March 15.  The timing of 
these potential secondary infections is consistent with what is known about the temporal 
dynamics of virus shedding and the serial interval for COVID-19.21 Among the 61 
attendees at the rehearsal, 53 cases in total were subsequently identified including the 
index case, with 33 confirmed through positive COVID-19 tests and 20 unconfirmed but 
probable secondary cases based on symptoms and timing. Accounting for the one 
presumed index case, the secondary infection attack rate is thus in the range 32/60 to 
52/60, or 53-87%.  
A seating chart obtained through personal communication showed the layout of 
participants among 120 chairs plus the position of the choir director and piano 
accompanist. Although the chart cannot be reproduced because of privacy concerns,19 
a centrally important point for interpreting the cause of transmission is that the cases 
were broadly distributed throughout the room with no clear spatial pattern.  
The rehearsal started at 6:30 pm. The SVC rehearsed in a single group in the 
Fellowship Hall for 45 minutes, then split into two approximately equal-sized groups for 
45 minutes. One group, mostly male singers, went to practice around a piano in a 
different room of the church, while a second group stayed in the Fellowship Hall.  After 
practicing separately, and following a 10-minute break, the members reconvened in the 
Fellowship Hall for another 50 minutes, until 9 pm.  During the split session, those who 
remained in the Fellowship Hall occupied about half of the space. 
Limited information is available about the heating and ventilating system; what was 
learned from personal communications is summarized here. The Fellowship Hall is 
heated by a relatively new commercial forced-air furnace. Three supply air registers are 
situated 2.4 m above the floor on one wall with a single return on an adjacent wall, just 
above the floor (~0.15 m). Someone in the front office reportedly turned on the heating 
system prior to the rehearsal to warm the space, and the thermostat was set to 20 °C 
(68 °F). It was about 7 °C (45 °F) outside, so the heating was on at the start of the 
rehearsal, but with so many people in the room, it did not need to stay on to maintain a 
comfortable temperature. During the entire rehearsal no exterior doors were open. It is 
not known whether the forced-air furnace fan operated (only) under thermostatic control 
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or whether it ran continuously. The furnace is installed with both outside make-up and 
combustion air, but it is not known how much outside make-up air was supplied that 
evening. The furnace is also outfitted with a MERV 11 filter, which has a single-pass 
efficiency of ≥ 30-65% for airborne particles of diameter 1 µm or larger.22,23  
Modeling Airborne Infection Risk 
Inhalation of respiratory aerosol most likely dominated infection transmission during this 
event, as other modes of transmission are unlikely to account for the high secondary 
attack rate.  For example, it seems infeasible that all attendees touched the same 
surface(s) as the index case. Furthermore, rehearsal attendees expressed that they had 
taken great care to minimize contact transmission (personal communication). There is 
no evidence to suggest that more than one person was infected at the time of the 
rehearsal. The index case would have spent extended time within a few meters of only 
a small proportion of the rehearsal attendees.  Other close contact events that extend to 
a high proportion of the attendees would have been brief and incidental.  Consequently, 
we believe it likely that shared air in the Fellowship Hall, combined with high emissions 
of respiratory aerosol from singing, were important contributing factors. 
On the basis of the available information about this event, a modeling effort was 
undertaken with two goals. The first goal was to estimate an average quanta emission 
rate that is consistent with the evidence. The calculation proceeds in two steps: 
determining the average airborne quanta concentration from the reported secondary 
infection attack rate, and then evaluating the emission rate that would have produced 
the inferred average concentration. The second modeling goal was to explore how a 
change in the loss rates, for example owing to improved ventilation and filtration, would 
have altered the infection risk. In pursuing both goals, the modeling effort uses an 
idealization of the more complex real situation, in part because some key data are 
lacking. A similar approach has been used in other studies to explore airborne infection 
risk in indoor environments.17,24  
The model of infection risk due to airborne transmission is based on the Wells-Riley 
formulation,25,26 as amended by Gammaitoni and Nucci.27 In applying this approach, 
these assumptions are made: i) there is one infectious individual who emits SARS-CoV-
2 quanta at a constant rate throughout the event, ii) there is no prior source of quanta in 
the space, iii) the latent period of the disease is longer than the time scale of the model, 
iv) the infectious respiratory aerosol quickly becomes evenly distributed throughout the 
room air, and v) infectious quanta are removed by first-order processes reflecting the 
sum of ventilation, filtration, deposition, and inactivation. The assumption that the indoor 
environment can be modeled as well-mixed is substantiated in this case by the broad 
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spatial distribution of secondary infections among the rehearsal participants. In 
epidemic modelling, where the aim is to assess the spread of the disease in the 
community, it is impossible to specify geometries, ventilation efficiency, and the 
locations of the infectious sources in each microenvironment. Therefore, adopting the 
well-mixed assumption is generally more reasonable than hypothesizing about specific 
patterns of emissions, airflow and removal processes.28 This distinctive superspreading 
event, occurring in an enclosed community facility, with indoor space shared for a 
specified period of time, offers a unique opportunity to examine a range of physical 
parameters that influence the eventual outcome. 
The modeled probability of infection (p) is related to the number of quanta inhaled (n) 
according to equation (1):26 
𝑝 = 1 − 𝑒!" (1) 
Equation (1) is used to estimate the average quanta concentration during the practice. 
The airborne quanta concentration increases with time from an initial value of zero 
following a “one minus exponential” form, which is the standard dynamic response of a 
well-mixed indoor volume to a constant input source. The time-average quanta 
concentration (Cavg, q m-3) is the quanta inhaled divided by the volume of air breathed. 
The volume of air breathed (m3) is equal to the duration of the event (D, h) multiplied by 
the volumetric breathing rate of rehearsal participants (Qb, m3 h-1). 
A well-mixed material balance model for the room (equation (2)) is applied next to relate 





− 𝜆𝐶 (2)  
Here V = volume of the rehearsal hall (m3) and λ = first-order loss rate coefficient for 
quanta (h-1) due to the summed effects of ventilation (λv), deposition onto surfaces 
(λdep), and virus decay (k).29 Assuming the quanta concentration is 0 at the beginning of 
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Here, t = time (h).  Equation (4) is rearranged to solve for the emission rate, E: 
Submitted to Indoor Air  15 June 2020 
7 






A Monte Carlo simulation was run (N = 1000) to estimate E for the superspreading 
event given a range of input values. The unknown parameters (p, Qb, λv, λdep, k) were 
specified as probabilistic using uniform distributions bounded by specified upper and 
lower limits. These parameters were assumed to be uncorrelated. 
The ranges of the uncertain model parameter values explored in the Monte Carlo 
simulation are summarized in Table 1. Constant values were used for the volume of the 
Fellowship Hall and the rehearsal duration. 
Table 1. Parametric Values used in the Monte Carlo Simulation for Estimating E 
Parameter Value(s) Distribution Reference(s) 
Probability of Infection, p (%) 53-87 Uniform 19 
Volumetric Breathing Rate, 
Qb (m3 h-1) 
0.65-1.38 Uniform 30, 31 
Loss Rate due to Ventilation, 
λv (h-1) 
0.3-1.0 Uniform Appendix 
Loss Rate due to Deposition 
onto Surfaces, λdep (h-1) 
0.3-1.5 Uniform 32, 33 
Loss Rate due to Virus 
Inactivation, k (h-1) 
0-0.63 Uniform 1, 2 
Volume of Rehearsal Hall, V 
(m3) 
810 Constant Personal 
Communication 
Duration of Rehearsal, D (h) 2.5 Constant 19 
Volumetric inhalation rates of singers have been reported by Binazzi et al.31 to be in the 
range 0.22-1.0 m3 h-1 and by Adams et al.30 to be 1.38 m3 h-1. SARS-CoV-2 was found 
in air samples in two size ranges: 0.5-1 µm and > 2.5 µm.7 The surface deposition loss 
rate range was based on data from Thatcher et al.33 and Diapouli et al.32 The range of 
values for virus decay is based on two sources: Fears et al.1 showed no decay in virus-
containing aerosol for 16 hours at 53% RH, whereas van Doremalen et al.2 estimated 
the half-life of airborne SARS-CoV-2 is 1.1 h, which equates to a decay rate of 0.63 h-1. 
The loss rate due to ventilation is likely to have been in the range from 0.3 to 1 h-1 (see 
Appendix). 
Results 
The mean (± standard deviation) inferred emission rate was E = 970 (± 390) quanta per 
h. Additional statistics for the distribution of E from the Monte Carlo simulation are as 
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follows: geometric mean = 900 q h-1; geometric standard deviation = 1.5; 10th, 25th, 50th, 
75th and 90th percentiles: 550, 680, 910, 1180, 1510 q h-1.  
The emission rate was derived based on an assumption of one index case. It is 
plausible that more than one person attending the rehearsal was infectious, given that 
the disease was diagnosed in some of the singers soon after the March 10 rehearsal. If 
this was the case then our emission rate would be the sum of emission rates from each 
infectious individual. However, the average incubation time for this case was ~3-4 days, 
which is comparable to literature reports, making the presence of additional index cases 
less likely. 
Quanta emission rates for influenza have been reported to be in the range 15-128 
quanta h-1;17,34 for measles: 5,580 q h-1;35 and for tuberculosis: 1.25 to 30,840 q h-1 (the 
high value attributed to intubation).36  The quanta for SARS transmission in a hospital 
and in an elementary school was estimated to be 28 q h-1.37 A forward model was used 
to estimate a large range of estimated quanta emission rates for SARS-COV-2, 
depending on activity level and respiratory activity: 10.5-1030 quanta h-1.24   
To explore the influence of changing the loss rate on the probability of infection, we 
performed sensitivity simulations in which we varied the loss rate.  In these simulations, 
we used the mean emission rate of E = 970 q h-1 and a constant volumetric breathing 
rate of Qb = 1.0 m3 h-1. If λ is systematically increased by some combination of 
increased ventilation, deposition, filtration, and inactivation loss rates, how would the 
probability of infection decrease?  We also explored what would happen if the emission 
rate was set at the 10th and 90th percentile values from the Monte Carlo simulation. 
Using the model equations above with λ ranging from 0.6 to 12 h-1, the percentage of 
the rehearsal participants infected is determined. The results are plotted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Probability of infection for each rehearsal participant as a function of loss 
rates for varying airborne quanta emission rates (E, q h-1).  Infection probability is 
plotted for the predicted mean emission rate (970 q h-1) and the 10thand 90th percentile 
emission rates (550 and 1510 q h-1, respectively.) A rehearsal duration of 2.5 hours, an 
indoor volume of 810 m3 and a volumetric breathing rate of 1.0 m3 h-1 were assumed. 
A key point displayed in Figure 1 is that, for the mean value E = 970 q h-1, increasing 
the loss rate coefficient from a nominal baseline value of 0.6 h-1 to 5 h-1 would reduce 
the probability of infection by a factor greater than two, from 91% to 42%. For the full 
range of loss rates plotted in Figure 1, the infection risks spans a factor of four: from 
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We also explored how changing the duration of the event would impact the probability of 
infection as a function of loss rate.  Again, we use the mean emission rate of 970 q h-1 
and a volumetric breathing rate of 1.0 m3 h-1. For durations ranging from 0.5 to 2.5 
hours, and λ ranging from 0.6 to 12 h-1, the predicted percentage infected ranged 
broadly, from 4% to 91%.  The results are plotted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Probability of infection as a function of loss rates for varying event duration 
(D, h).  A mean emission rate (970 q h-1) and constant volumetric breathing rates of 1.0 
m3 h-1 were assumed. 
Discussion 
Growing evidence supports a view that inhaling respiratory aerosol is an important route 
for transmission of SARS-CoV-2 under certain conditions. At the time of the chorale 
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person-to-person contact and touching of surfaces was consciously limited. The risk of 
widespread transmission owing to close contact would seem to be low in this event, 
considering that there is believed to have been only one index case who would have 
been seated in proximity to only a small proportion of the other chorale members. If 
transmission by close contact and/or fomites were indeed the dominant modes of 
transmission, then the secondary attack rate should have been much smaller than the 
observed range of 53-87%. We would also expect to see the secondary cases 
predominantly among those in closer proximity to the index case rather than distributed 
broadly throughout the room. Given the circumstances of the rehearsal, such a high 
secondary attack rate by the close-contact route would have necessitated effective 
transmission based largely on brief proximate encounters. That interpretation of the high 
attack rate in this event seems much less probable than the alternative explanation, i.e. 
that inhalation of infectious respiratory aerosol from “shared air” was the leading mode 
of transmission.  
Literature evidence suggests that singing could have been a contributing factor to the 
high secondary attack rate compared to other common indoor activities. The rate of 
aerosol emission during vocal activities increases with the loudness of the sound.15 A 
study of respiratory emissions also found higher emission rates of respiratory droplets to 
be associated with more extensive vocalization.38 Outbreaks of tuberculosis, a disease 
known to be transmitted via inhalation, have been linked to singing.39-41 At the time this 
article is being written, there have been additional media reports of COVID-19 
outbreaks associated with choirs. Cases with high secondary attack rates have been 
reported in the Netherlands, Austria, Canada, Germany, England, South Korea, and 
Spain.42,43  
Loudon and Roberts44 characterized respiratory aerosol emitted during talking, singing 
and coughing. They reported that “fewer droplets were expelled during singing than 
during talking, but a higher proportion of them were in the smaller size range. The 
percentage of droplets still airborne as droplet nuclei after a 30-minute settling period 
were 35.7, 6.4, and 48.9 for singing, talking, and coughing, respectively.”  
The inferred emission rate of 970 quanta h-1 is plausible given observations of airborne 
concentrations of SARS-CoV-2 in hospitals. The highest concentrations reported 
averaged 3000 ± 2700 viral RNA copies m-3 across 18 measurements in Nebraska9 and 
2600 ± 1000 viral RNA copies m-3 and across two measurements in Singapore.3 In the 
Singapore study, the highest values were measured on day 5 of illness where a 
symptomatic patient had a high viral load in their nasopharyngeal swab (Ct value 
18.45). If the dominant removal mechanism is ventilation at an average rate of 13 h-1 in 
Nebraska and 12 h-1 in Singapore, then these concentrations correspond to emission 
rates of the order of 106 viral RNA copies h-1 from a patient. Typically, only 0.1-1% of 
Submitted to Indoor Air  15 June 2020 
12 
viral RNA copies represent an infectious virion for influenza,45 so if that value is 
applicable to SARS-CoV-2, the emission rate would correspond to 1000-10,000 
infectious virions emitted per hour; viral load emitted also varied between coughing and 
breathing/speaking.45 Lindsley et al. have shown this effect, too, for infectious influenza 
virus.46  
The plausibility of the inferred quanta emission rate can also be demonstrated by 
combining evidence on respiratory aerosol emissions with viral loads for SARS-CoV-2 
in saliva.  Concentrations of respiratory aerosol in exhaled breath that are smaller than 
10 µm diameter are in the approximate range 1-10 nL m-3 for vocalization activities.38  
For this concentration range, a volumetric breathing rate of 1 m3 h-1 would produce an 
emission rate of 1-10 nL h-1 of respiratory aerosol.  In limited sampling of SARS-CoV-2 
in saliva and other respiratory fluids, viral loads as high as 1011 viral RNA copies mL-1 
have been reported.10,11,12,50 At 10 nL h-1, a viral load in respiratory fluids of 1011 RNA 
copies mL-1 (= 105 copies nL-1) would lead to the emission of 106 viral RNA copies per 
h, which would be of order 1000 quanta h-1 assuming an equivalence of 1 quanta to 
1000 viral RNA copies.   
This modeling analysis has explored the very probable situation in which transmission 
by inhaling respiratory aerosol that were released during singing caused a large COVID-
19 outbreak. Accumulating evidence points to these factors being important for 
increasing the risk of airborne transmission indoors: high occupancy, long duration, loud 
vocalization, and poor ventilation.  
In the domain of indoor environmental quality control, the first and best measure is 
generally to minimize indoor emissions.47  Because we are not yet able to identify 
individuals who are highly infectious and therefore are potential superspreaders, 
effective source control can not be so well practiced, short of suspending high-risk 
indoor events.  The simulation results presented here show that the risk of secondary 
infections can be substantially reduced although not practically eliminated through a 
combination of increasing removal rates and by limiting the duration of indoor activities. 
The high ventilation rate in the hospital settings combined with other controls such as 
use of isolation rooms and effective PPE is likely to mitigate transmission from a high 
viral shedder in the healthcare environment.3,9 In the many community indoor spaces 
not dedicated to infection control, controlling airborne diseases transmission remains a 
great challenge during this pandemic. Ventilation rates corresponding to current 
standards would allow occupancy duration of only about 0.5 h for an infection risk level 
below 10% for a such high emission activity as investigated here. Indoor environmental 
quality control measures available to improve conditions include enhanced ventilation, 
mechanical filtration, and germicidal ultraviolet disinfection.48,49  Widespread application 
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of effective indoor environment controls could help limit the extent of superspreading 
events and therefore contribute to slowing the pandemic spread. 
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Appendix 
Ventilation Rate Estimates 
The ventilation rate was estimated assuming that the HVAC fan was not operating 
during the rehearsal and that the metabolic energy generated by the SVC rehearsal 
attendees was sufficient to maintain a comfortable temperature without supplemental 
heating. For conditions of metabolic activity at 1.2 met, clothing insulation of 1.0 clo, at 
22 °C (71 °F), the metabolic heat generation per occupant is 78 W. 51 Assuming that half 
of the metabolic energy goes to continuously heat the room air (with the other half lost 
through the building envelope by conduction and to heat storage), then each occupant 
would contribute 39 W to the ventilation air. Given the reported difference between 
indoor and outdoor temperature (23 °F = 13 K) and the heat capacity of air (1 J g-1 K-1), 
one can derive the ventilation rate to be 39 W person-1 ÷ 13 J g-1 = 3 g/s per person.  At 
a density of 1.2 g/L, the resulting ventilation flow rate would be 2.5 L/s per person. For a 
room volume of 810 m3 with 61 occupants, the corresponding air-change rate would be 
0.7 per h-1. We bracket this estimate by applying an uncertainty of ± 50% so that the 
modeled range in the Monte Carlo simulation is 0.3-1 per h. 
By way of comparison, we have estimated the outdoor air ventilation rate based on the 
relevant ASHRAE standard combined with information from the mechanical drawings 
for the rehearsal hall under the assumption that the HVAC fan was on for the event 
duration. The outdoor make-up air flow specified by ASHRAE Standard 62.1 for places 
of worship (Table 6.2.2.1) is 2.5 L s-1 person-1 + 0.3 L s-1 per m2 of floor area. 52 The 
default occupant density is 120 persons per 100 m2 of floor area. The corresponding 
outdoor air rate per m2 of floor area would then be (120/100) ´ 2.5 + 0.3 = 3.3 L s-1 m-2. 
The reported averaging ceiling height for the Fellowship Hall is 4.5 m and the estimated 
floor area is 180 m2.  The total ventilation flow rate would therefore be 180 ´ 3.3 = 594 L 
s-1 = 2100 m3 h-1, corresponding to an air-change rate of 2.6 h-1.  Additionally, 
mechanical drawings of the rehearsal hall show specifications of 3 ´ 1560 cfm supply 
registers (indicated to be 8 ft above the floor along one wall).  This information indicates 
that the ventilation system is designed to supply 4700 cfm = 8000 m3 h-1, which would 
be a mixture of outdoor air and recirculated indoor air (filtered through a MERV 11 filter). 
That supply flow rate corresponds to 10 room volumes per hour.  Applying the outdoor 
air flow rate from ASHRAE 62.1, at this overall flow rate, the mix would be about 25% 
outside air and 75% recirculated air. These 2.5-10 effective air changes per hour are 
unlikely to have been provided during the rehearsal, based on personal communication 
received during our investigation.  
